We propose to study proof search from a coinductive point of view. In this paper, we consider intuitionistic logic and a focused system based on Herbelin's LJT for the implicational fragment. We introduce a variant of lambda calculus with potentially infinitely deep terms and a means of expressing alternatives for the description of the "solution spaces" (called Böhm forests), which are a representation of all (not necessarily well-founded but still locally well-formed) proofs of a given formula (more generally: of a given sequent).
Introduction
Proof theory starts with the observation that a proof is more than just the truth value of a theorem. A valid theorem can have many proofs, and several of them can be interesting. In this paper, we somehow extend this to the limit and study all proofs of a given proposition. Of course, who studies proofs can also study any of them (or count them, if there are only finitely many possible proofs, or try to enumerate them in the countable case). But we do this study somehow simultaneously: we introduce a language to express the full "solution space" of proof search. And since we focus on the generative aspects of proof search, it would seem awkward to filter out failed proof attempts from the outset. This does not mean that we pursue impossible paths in the proof search (which would hardly make sense) but that we allow to follow infinite paths. An infinite path does not correspond to a successful proof, but it is a structure of locally correct proof steps. In other words, we use coinductive syntax to model all locally correct proof figures. This gives rise to a not necessarily wellfounded search tree. However, to keep the technical effort simpler, we have chosen a logic where this tree is finitely branching, namely the implicational fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic (with proof system given by the cut-free fragment of the system λ by Herbelin [3] ).
Lambda terms or variants of them (expressions that may have bound variables) are a natural means to express proofs (an observation that is called the Curry-Howard isomorphism) in implicational logic. Proof alternatives (locally, there are only finitely many of them since our logic has no quantifier that ranges over infinitely many individuals) can be formally represented by a finite sum of such solution space expressions, and it is natural to consider those sums up to equivalence of the set of the alternatives. Since infinite lambda-terms are involved and since whole solution spaces are being modeled, we call these coinductive terms Böhm forests.
By their coinductive nature, Böhm forests are no proper syntactic objects: they can be defined by all mathematical (meta-theoretic) means and are thus not "concrete", as would be expected from syntactic elements. This freedom of definition will be demonstrated and exploited in the canonical definition (Definition 6) of Böhm forests as solutions to the task of proving a sequent (a formula A in a given context Γ). In a certain sense, nothing is gained by this representation: although one can calculate on a case-by-case basis the Böhm forest for a formula of interest and see that it is described as fixed point of a system of equations (involving auxiliary Böhm forests as solutions for the other meta-variables that appear in those equations), an arbitrary Böhm forest can only be observed to any finite depth, without ever knowing whether it is the expansion of a regular cyclic graph structure (the latter being a finite structure).
Our main result is that the Böhm forests that appear as solution spaces of sequents have such a finitary nature: more precisely, they can be interpreted as semantics of a finite term in a variant of lambda calculus with alternatives and formal greatest fixed-points. For the Horn fragment (where nesting of implications to the left is disallowed), this works very smoothly without surprises (Theorem 15). The full implicational case, however, needs some subtleties concerning the fixed-point variables over which the greatest fixed points are formed and about capturing redundancy that comes from the introduction of several hypotheses that suppose the same formula. The interpretation of the finite expressions in terms of Böhm forests needs a special operation that we call co-contraction (contraction bottom-up). However, this operation is already definable in terms of Böhm forests. Without this operation, certain repetitive patterns in the solution spaces due to the presence of negative occurrences of implications could not be identified. With it, we obtain the finitary representation (Theorem 24).
In the next section, we quickly recapitulate syntax and typing rules of the cut-free fragment of system λ and also carefully describe its restriction to Horn formulas. Section 3 has the definition of the not necessarily well-founded proofs, corresponding to a coinductive reading of λ (including its typing system). This is system λ co . Elimination alternatives are then added to this system (yielding the Böhm forests), which directly allow the definition of the solution spaces for the proof search for sequents. We give several examples and then show that the defined solution spaces adequately represent all the λ co proofs of a sequent.
In Section 4, we present first the finitary system to capture the Horn fragment and then modify it to get the main result for full implicational logic.
The paper closes with discussions on related and future work in Section 5.
Background
We recall below the cut-free fragment of system λ (a.k.a. LJT), a sequent calculus for intuitionistic implication by Herbelin [3] . Letters p, q, r are used to range over a base set of propositional variables (which we also call atoms). Letters A, B,C are used to range over the set of formulas (= types) built from propositional variables using the implication connective (that we write A ⊃ B) that is parenthesized to the right. Often we will use the fact that any implicational formula can be uniquely decomposed as A 1 ⊃ A 2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ A n ⊃ p with n ≥ 0, also written in vectorial notation as A ⊃ p. For example, if the vector A is empty the notation means simply p, and if A = A 1 , A 2 , the notation means
The cut-free expressions of λ are separated into terms and lists, and are given by: 
where a countably infinite set of variables ranged over by letters x, y, w, z is assumed. Note that in lambdaabstractions we adopt a domain-full presentation, annotating the bound variable with a formula. The term constructor xl is usually called application. Usually in the meta-level we prefer to write x t 1 , . . . ,t n (with n ∈ N 0 ) to range over application constructions, and avoid speaking about lists explicitly (where obviously, the notation t 1 , . . . ,t n means if n = 0 and t 1 :: l, if t 2 , . . . ,t n means l). In the meta-level, when we know n = 0, instead of x t 1 , . . . ,t n , we simply write the variable x. We will view contexts Γ as finite lists of declarations x : A, where no variable x occurs twice. The context Γ, x : A is obtained from Γ by adding the declaration x : A, and will only be written if this yields again a valid context, i. e., if x is not declared in Γ. The system has a form of sequent for each class of expressions:
Note the restriction to atomic sequents (the RHS formula is an atom) in the case of list sequents. The rules of λ for deriving sequents are in Figure 1 . Note that, as list sequents are atomic, the conclusion of the application rule is also atomic. This is not the case in Herbelin's original system [3] , where list sequents can have a non-atomic formula on the RHS. In the variant of cut-free λ we adopted, the only rule available for deriving a term sequent whose RHS is an implication is RIntro. Still, our atomic restriction will not cause loss of completeness of the system for intuitionistic implication. This restriction is typically adopted in systems tailored for proof search, as for example systems of focused proofs. In fact, λ corresponds to a focused backward chaining system where all atoms are asynchronous (see e. g. Liang and Miller [7] ).
We will need the following properties of λ . Proof Simultaneous induction on derivability.
Since the empty list has no type index, we need to know A in the second statement of the previous lemma. 2. term sequents are restricted to atomic sequents, i. e., term sequents are of the form Γ ⊢ t : p.
Lemma 2 (Inversion of typing)
As a consequence, the λ -abstraction construction and the rule RIntro, that types it, are no longer needed. The restricted typing rules are presented in Figure 2 .
Coinductive representation of proof search in lambda-bar
We want to represent the whole search space for cut-free proofs in λ . This is profitably done with coinductive structures. Of course, we only consider locally correct proofs. Since proof search may fail when infinite branches occur (depth-first search could be trapped there), we will consider such infinite proofs as proofs in an extended sense and represent them as well, thus we will introduce expressions that comprise all the possible well-founded and non-wellfounded proofs in cut-free λ . The raw syntax of these possibly non-wellfounded proofs is presented as follows
yielding the (co)terms of system λ co (read coinductively, as indicated by the index co). Note that instead of a formal class of lists l as in the λ -system, we adopt here the more intuitive notation N 1 , . . . , N k to represent finite lists.
Since the raw syntax is interpreted coinductively, also the typing rules have to be interpreted coinductively, which is symbolized by the double horizontal line in Figure 3 , a notation that we learnt from Nakata, Uustalu and Bezem [9] . (Of course, the formulas/types stay inductive.) As expected, the restriction of the typing relation to the finite λ -terms coincides with the typing relation of the λ system:
Proof By induction on t, with the help of Lemma 2. 
It is quite common to describe elements of coinductive syntax by (systems of) fixed point equations. As a notation on the meta-level for unique solutions of fixed-point equations, we will use the binder ν 
We now come to the representation of whole search spaces. The set of coinductive cut-free λ -terms with finite numbers of elimination alternatives is denoted by λ co Σ and is given by the following grammar:
where both n, k ≥ 0 are arbitrary. Note that summands cannot be lambda-abstractions. 1 We will often use ∑ i E i instead of E 1 + · · · + E n if the dependency of E i on i is clear, as well as the number of elements.
Likewise, we write
If n = 1, we write E 1 for E 1 + · · · + E n (in particular this injects the category of elimination alternatives into the category of co-terms) and do as if + was a binary operation on (co)terms. However, this will always have a unique reading in terms of our raw syntax of λ co Σ . In particular, this reading makes + associative and O its neutral element.
Co-terms of λ co Σ will also be called Böhm forests. Their coinductive typing rules are the ones of λ co , together with the rule given in Figure 4 , where the sequents for (co)terms and elimination alternatives are not distinguished notationally.
Notice that Γ ⊢ O : p for all Γ and p. Below we consider sequents Γ ⇒ A with Γ a context and A an implicational formula (corresponding to term sequents of λ without proof terms -in fact, Γ ⇒ A is nothing but the pair consisting of Γ and A, but which is viewed as a problem description: to prove formula A in context Γ). 
Definition 6 The function S , which takes a sequent Γ ⇒ A and produces a Böhm forest which is a coinductive representation of the sequent's solution space, is given corecursively as follows: In the case of an implication,
S (Γ ⇒ A ⊃ B) := λ x A .S (Γ, x : A ⇒ B) , sinceS (Γ ⇒ p) := ∑ i E i .
This is more sloppily written as
In this manner, we can even write the whole definition in one line:
This is a well-formed definition: for every Γ and A, S (Γ ⇒ A) is a Böhm forest and as such rather a semantic object.
Lemma 7 Given Γ and A, the typing
Let us illustrate the function S at work with some examples. 
Example 8 We consider first the formula A = (p ⊃ p) ⊃ p ⊃ p and the empty context. We have:
and so we have 
Example 10 Let us consider one further example where A = ((((p
⊃ q) ⊃ p) ⊃ p) ⊃ q) ⊃ q
(a formula that can be viewed as double negation of Pierce's law, when q is viewed as absurdity). We have the following (where in sequents we omit formulas on the LHS)
Now, in N 9 observe that y, y 1 We now define a membership semantics for co-terms and elimination alternatives of λ co Σ in terms of sets of (co)terms in λ co .
The 
Proposition 11 For any N
Proof "If". Consider the relations
It suffices to show that R ⊆ mem, but this cannot be proven alone since mem and mem E are defined simultaneously. We also prove R E ⊆ mem E , and to prove both by coinduction on the membership relations, it suffices to show that the relations R, R E are backwards closed, i. e.:
"Only if". By coinduction on the typing relation of λ co . This is conceptually easier than the other direction since ⊢ is a single coinductively defined notion. We define a relation R for which it is sufficient to prove R ⊆⊢:
Proving R ⊆⊢ by coinduction amounts to showing that R is backwards closed -with respect to the typing relation of λ co , i. e., we have to show:
We show the second case (relative to rule LVecIntro). So, we have mem(N, S (Γ ⇒ A)) with N = x N 1 , . . . , N k and A = p, and we need to show that, for some ( 
Example 12 Let us consider the case of Pierce's law that is not valid intuitionistically. We have (for
The fact that we arrived at O and found no elimination alternatives on the way annihilates the co-term and implies there are no terms in the solution space of ⇒ ((p ⊃ q) ⊃ p) ⊃ p (hence no proofs, not even infinite ones).
Corollary 13 (Adequacy of the co-inductive representation of proof search in λ ) For any t ∈ λ , we have mem(t, S (Γ ⇒ A)) iff Γ ⊢ t : A (where the latter is the inductive typing relation of λ ).
Proof By the proposition above and Lemma 3.
Finitary representation of proof search in lambda-bar
In the first section we define a calculus of finitary representations. In the third section we obtain our main result (Theorem 24): given Γ ⇒ C, there is a finitary representation of S (Γ ⇒ C) in the finitary calculus.
To make the proof easier to understand, we first develop in the second section the particular case of the Horn fragment.
The finitary calculus
The set of inductive cut-free λ -terms with finite numbers of elimination alternatives, and a fixpoint operator is denoted by λ gfp Σ and is given by the following grammar (read inductively):
where X is assumed to range over a countably infinite set of fixpoint variables (letters Y , Z will also be used to range over fixpoint variables that may also be thought of as meta-variables), and where both n, k ≥ 0 are arbitrary. Below, when we refer to finitary terms we have in mind the terms of λ gfp Σ . The fixed-point operator is called gfp ("greatest fixed point") to indicate that its semantics is (now) defined in terms of infinitary syntax, but there, fixed points are unique. Hence, the reader may just read this as "the fixed point".
We now give a straightforward interpretation of the formal fixed points (built with gfp) of λ gfp Σ in terms of the coinductive syntax of λ co Σ (using the ν operation on the meta-level). Remark that the recursive definition above has an embedded corecursive case (pertaining to the gfpoperator). Its definition is well-formed since every elimination alternative starts with a head/application variable and the occurrences of N are thus guarded.
Definition 14 We call environment a function from the set of fixpoint variables into the set of (co)terms
When a finitary term N has no free occurrences of fixpoint variables, all environments determine the same coterm, and in this case we simply write [[N]] to denote that coterm. 
Equivalence of the representations: Horn case

Proof
Let us assume there are k atoms occurring in Γ ⇒ r. We define simultaneously k functions N p ( − − → X : q) (one for each atom p occurring in Γ ⇒ r), parameterized by a vector of declarations of the form X : q. The vector is written − − → X : q and is such that no fixpoint variable and no atom occurs twice. The simultaneous definition is by recursion on the number of atoms of Γ ⇒ r not occurring in − − → X : q, and is as follows: 
By induction on the number of atoms of (the fixed sequent) Γ ⇒ r not in (the variable) − − → X : q, we prove that:
Case p = q i , for some i. Then,
Otherwise,
where N ∞ is given as the unique solution of the following equation:
Now observe that, by I.H., the following equations (3) and (4) are equivalent.
By definition of S (Γ ⇒ p), (4) holds; hence -because of (3) -S (Γ ⇒ p) is the solution N ∞ of (2), concluding the proof that LHS = RHS. Finally, the theorem follows as the particular case of (1) where p = r and the vector of fixpoint variable declarations is empty.
Equivalence of the representations: full implicational case
The main difference with exhaustive proof search in the case of Horn formulas is that the backwards application of RIntro brings new variables into the context that may have the same type as an already existing declaration, and so, for the purpose of proof search, they should be treated the same way.
We illustrate this phenomenon with the following definition and lemma and then generalize it to the form that will be needed for the main theorem (Theorem 24). 
Lemma 17 (Co-contraction: invertibility of contraction) If
Proof The proof is omitted since Lemma 20 below is essentially a generalization of this result.
We now capture when a context Γ ′ is an inessential extension of context Γ:
Let σ range over sequents of the form Γ ⇒ p. Thus, the last definition clause defines in general when σ ≤ σ ′ .
Definition 19
1 
We prove that R is backward closed relative to the canonical equivalence = generated by the coinductive definition of terms of λ co Σ
(but see the comments following the proof), whence R ⊆=.
and
where
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that (i) each head-variable z that is a "capability" of the summation in (5) is matched by a head-variable w that is a "capability" of the summation in (6); and (ii) vice-versa.
So we may take y = z. Second and last case: z ∈ Γ ′ \Γ. By Γ ≤ Γ ′ , there is y ∈ Γ such that (z : Γ(y)) ∈ Γ ′ . But then (z : ∆(y)) ∈ ∆ ′ .
(ii) We have to show that, for all y ∈ dom(∆), and all (w : ∆(y)) ∈ ∆ ′ , w ∈ dom(∆ ′ ). But this is immediate.
Notice that we cannot expect that the summands appear in the same order in (5) and (6) . Therefore, we have to be more careful with the notion of equality of Böhm forests. It is not just bisimilarity, but we assume that the sums of elimination alternatives are treated as if they were sets of alternatives, i. e., we further assume that + is symmetric and idempotent. It has been shown by Picard and the second author [10] that bisimulation up to permutations in unbounded lists of children can be managed in a coinductive type even with the interactive proof assistant Coq. In analogy, this coarser notion of equality (even abstracting away from the number of occurrences of an alternative) should not present a major obstacle for a fully formal presentation.
In the rest of the paper -in particular in Theorem 24 -we assume that sums of alternatives are treated as if they were sets.
Example 21 (Example 10 continued) Thanks to the preceding lemma, N 9 is obtained by co-contraction from N 5 :
where the type of x has been omitted. Hence, N 6 , N 7 , N 8 and N 9 can be eliminated, and N 5 can be expressed as the (meta-level) fixed point:
now missing out all types in the context substitution. Finally, we obtain the closed Böhm forest
The question is now how to give a finitary meaning to terms like N 5 in the example above, which are defined by fixed points over variables subject to context substitution. We might expect to use the equation defining N 5 to obtain a finitary representation in λ gfp Σ , provided context substitution is defined on this system. But how to do that? Applying say [x, y, z, y 1 , z 1 /x, y, z] to a plain fixed-point variable cannot make much sense.
The desired finitary representation in the full implicational case is obtained by adjusting the terms of λ gfp Σ used in the Horn case as follows:
Hence fixpoint variables are "typed" with sequents σ . Different free occurrences of the same X may be "typed" with different σ 's, as long as a lower bound of these σ 's can be found w.r.t. ≤ (Definition 18).
Relatively to Definition 14, an environment ξ now assigns (co)terms N of λ co Σ to "typed" fixpoint variables X σ , provided X does not occur with two different "types" in the domain of ξ , for all X ; we also change the following clauses:
We will have to assign some default value to X σ ′ in case there is no such σ , but this will not play a role in the main result below.
Map N p ( − − → X : q) used in the proof of Theorem 15 is replaced by the following: Proof Let us call recursive call a "reduction"
where the if-guard in Def. 22 fails; ∆ and σ are defined as in the same definition; and, for some y, (y : B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆. We want to prove that every sequence of recursive calls from N Γ⇒C (·) is finite. First we introduce some definitions. A sub := {B | there is A ∈ A such that B is subformula of A}, for A a finite set of formulas. We say A is subformula-closed if A sub = A . A stripped sequent is a pair (B, p) , where B is a finite set of formulas. If σ = Γ ⇒ p, then |σ | denotes the stripped sequent (|Γ|, p). We say (B, p) is over A if B ⊆ A and p ∈ A . There are size(A ) := a · 2 k stripped sequents over A , if a (resp. k) is the number of atoms (resp. formulas) in A .
Let A be subformula-closed. We say Γ ⇒ C and Ξ := − −−−−− → X : Θ ⇒ q satisfy the A -invariant if: Proof of (I). By assumption, (i), (ii), and (iii) above hold. We want to prove:
Proof of (i'). |∆| = |Γ| ∪ {A 1 , · · · , A n } ⊆ A by (i) and A subformula-closed. B j is a subformula of B ⊃ p and B ⊃ p ∈ |∆| because (y : B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆, for some y.
Proof of (ii'). Immediate by (ii) and Γ ⊆ ∆. Proof of (iii'). For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, q j ∈ |Γ| sub ⊆ |∆| sub , by (iii) and Γ ⊆ ∆. On the other hand, q j+1 = p ∈ |∆| sub because (y : B ⊃ p) ∈ ∆, for some y.
Proof of (II). Given that the if-guard of Def. 22 fails, and that Θ i ⊆ Γ due to (ii) Proof We prove: if, for all i, ξ (X
In this proof we re-use the concepts introduced in the proof of Lemma 23. Let
The proof is by induction on size(A ) − size(Ξ).
Case p = q i and Θ ′ i ⊆ Γ and |Θ ′ i | = |∆|, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, with m the length of Ξ. Then,
(by definition and (*) below) 
and, again, ∆ := Γ ∪ {z 1 : A 1 , · · · , z n : A n }. Now observe that, by I.H., the following equations (10) and (11) are equivalent.
By definition of S (∆ ⇒ p), (11) holds; hence -because of (10) -S (∆ ⇒ p) is the solution N ∞ of (9). Therefore LHS = λ z
, and the latter is RHS by definition of S (Γ ⇒ A ⊃ p). Finally, the theorem follows as the particular case of (8) where C = A ⊃ p and the vector of fixpoint variable declarations is empty.
Conclusion
We proposed a coinductive approach to proof search, which we illustrated in the case of the cut-free system LJT for intuitionistic implication (and its proof-annotated version λ ). As the fundamental tool, we introduced the coinductive calculus λ co Σ , which besides the coinductive reading of λ , introduces a construction for finite alternatives. The (co)terms of this calculus (also called Böhm forests) are used to represent the solution space of proof search for LJT -sequents, and this is achieved by means of a corecursive function, whose definition arises naturally by taking a reductive view of the inference rules and by using the finite alternatives construction to account for multiple alternatives in deriving a given sequent.
We offered also a finitary representation of proof search in LJT , based on the inductive calculus λ gfp Σ with finite alternatives and a fixed point construction, and showed equivalence of the representations. The equivalence results turned out to be an easy task in the case of the Horn fragment, but demanded for co-contraction of contexts (contraction bottom-up) in the case of full implication.
With Pym and Ritter [11] we share the general goal of setting a framework for studying proof search, and the reductive view of inference rules, by which each inference rule is seen as a reduction operator (from a putative conclusion to a collection of sufficient premises), and reduction (the process of repeatedly applying reduction operators) may fail to yield a (finite) proof. However, the methods are very different. Instead of using a coinductive approach, Pym and Ritter introduce the λ µνε-calculus for classical sequent calculus as the means for representing derivations and for studying intuitionistic proof search (a task that is carried out both in the context of the sequent calculus LJ and of intuitionistic resolution).
In the context of logic programming with classical first-order Horn clauses, and building on their previous work [6, 4] , Komendantskaya and Power [5] establish a coalgebraic semantics uniform for both finite and infinite SLD-resolutions. In particular, a notion of coinductive (and-or) derivation tree of an atomic goal w. r. t. a (fixed) program is introduced. Soundness and completeness results of SLDresolution relative to coinductive derivation trees and to the coalgebraic semantics are also proved. Logic programming is viewed as search for uniform proofs in sequent calculus by Miller et al. [8] . For intuitionistic implication, uniform proofs correspond to the class of (η-)expanded normal natural deductions (see Dyckoff and Pinto [2] ), hence to the typed λ -terms we considered in this paper (recall the restriction to atoms in rule Der of Fig. 1 for typing application) . Under this view, our work relates to Komendantskaya and Power [5] , as both works adopt a coinductive approach in the context of proof search. However, the two approaches are different in methods and in goals. As the basis of the coinductive representation of the search space, instead of and-or infinite trees, we follow the Curry-Howard view of proofs as terms, and propose the use of a typed calculus of coinductive lambda-terms. Whereas Komendantskaya and Power [5] are already capable of addressing first-order quantification, we only consider intuitionistic implication. Still, as we consider full intuitionistic implication, our study is not contained in classical Horn logic. The fact that we need to treat negative occurrences of implication, raises on the logic programming side the need for dealing with programs to which clauses can be added dynamically.
As a priority for future work, we plan to develop notions of normalisation for the calculi λ co Σ and λ gfp Σ in connection with aspects of proof search like pruning search spaces and reading off (finite) proofs.
In order to test for the generality of our approach, we intend to extend it to treat the first-order case. Staying within intuitionistic implication, but changing the proofs searched for, another case study we intend to investigate is Dyckhoff's contraction-free system [1] .
